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Recent Changes in Procedures of the Department of
Environmental Quality
Kenneth M. Murchison*
Experienced attorneys understand that administrative procedures often control
the substance of environmental law. In Louisiana, the Secretary of the
Department of Environmental Quality has broad discretion to set the content of
environmental regulations and fees;' to issue, to deny, or to place conditions on
permits;2 and to select the appropriate method to enforce the Environmental
Quality Act? Lawyers who represent the regulated community as well as those
who represent environmental groups recognize the importance of procedures for
controlling the secretary's discretion.
The procedures used by the Department of Environmental Quality have long
been controversial. When the department was created in 1983,' it continued to
use the procedures established by its predecessor, the Environmental Control
Commission.! On at least two occasions, the secretary proposed a new set of
procedural rules; however, both proposals were withdrawn before rules were
promulgated.' The secretary has replaced some aspects of the commission
rules,7 but the unrepealed portions remain in effect.
In 1994, the Louisiana Law Institute proposed a statutory codification of the
procedures the Department of Environmental Quality uses with respect to
permits, enforcement actions, and other declaratory rulings! Although the
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1. See e.g., La. R.S. 30:2011(DXI), 2014(B), 2054(B)(1)
, 
(3), (5)-(8), 2074(BXI)-(3),
2154(B), 2180(A), (DX2)(h) (1989 and Supp. 1997). The Environmental Quality Act makes the
department "the primary agency" responsible for environmental protection. La. R.S. 30:201 1(AXI)
(Supp. 1997). This designation imposes constitutional obligations on the secretary to fulfill the
requirements of La. Const. art. IX, § 1. See Save Ourselves, Inc. v. Louisiana Envtl. Control
Comm'n, 452 So. 2d 1152 (La. 1984); Murchison, Enforcing Environmental Standards Under State
Law: The Louisiana Environmental Quality Act, 57 La. L. Rev. 497, 497-98 (1997). Violations of
rules issued by the secretary can be punished as felonies. State v. All Pro Paint and Body Shop, Inc.,
639 So. 2d 707 (La. 1994); Murchison, supra at 545-49.
2. See. e.g.. La. K.S. 30:2011(DX2), 2054(BX2), 2074(B)(4), 2154(B)(2), 2180(AX2) (1989
and Supp. 1997). The secretary can delegate this permitting power to an assistant secretary. See,
e.g., l.a R.S. 30:201 1(DX3), (0), 2014(A), 2022(CXI). 2054(B)(2), 2074(B)(4), 2154(BX2) (1989
and Supp. 1997).
3. See La. R.S. 30:2025 (1989 and Supp. 1997); see generally Murchison, supra note i, at
500-03.
4. 1983 La. Acts No. 97, § 1.
5. See La. K.S. 30:2025 (1989 and Supp. 1997); see generally Murchison, supra note 1, at 501
n.34.
6. See 21 La. Reg. 554 (1994).
7. See La. Env. Reg. C. pt. 1, §§ 301-73.
8. The author was a co-reporter of the committee that drafted the law institute proposal.
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legislature did not enact any legislation based on the law institute proposal in
1994, it subsequently adopted a number of significant procedural reforms. In the
1995 regular session, the legislature adopted a variety of reforms. Perhaps most
significantly, the legislature proposed a constitutional amendment (later adopted
by the electorate) relating to administrative imposition of fees.9 It also placed
statutory restrictions on the ability of agencies to impose or to raise fees; 0
imposed new limits on rulemaking by the Department of Environmental Quality
and other administrative agencies;" added a chapter on enforcement procedures
and judicial review to the Environmental Quality Act; and enacted other
statutes relating to adjudications,' declaratory rulings,"4 and judicial review."3
In the special session of 1996, the legislature revisited the issue of judicial
review" and reversed a decision" that had invalidated the 1995 legislation.
This Article surveys and evaluates these recent changes. The first section
summarizes the content of the changes, and the second explains their significance.
The final portion of the article ruminates on what effect the changes are likely to
have with respect to the protection of the state's environment.
I. SUMMARY OF THE RECENT CHANGES
A. Fees
In the 1995 regular session, the legislature made several changes regarding
administrative imposition of fees. The most important was to propose a constitu-
tional amendment prohibiting any new or increased fees without the approval of a
supermajority of the legislature." Other statutes limited administrative authority
to impose fees by requiring the use of rulemaking procedures" and by limiting
increases in fees to five percent per year.20
The voters approved the proposed constitutional amendment, which became
section 2.1 of Article VII. The new section makes it nearly as difficult to impose
9. La. Const. art VII, § 2.1 (proposed by 1995 La. Acts No. 1324, § 1). See infra notes 18-24
and accompanying text.
10. La. R.S. 49:953(7), 971(AX3) (Supp. 1997). See infra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
11. La. R.S. 49:953(BX4), (F), (G), 969 (1989 and Supp. 1997). See infra notes 30-57 and
accompanying text.
12. 1995 La. Acts No. 947, § 1, adding La. R.S. 30:2050.1-.29 (Supp. 1997). See infra notes
89-120 and accompanying text.
13. 1995 La. Acts No. 739, § 1. See Infra notes 58-85 and accompanying text.
14. La. R.S. 30:2050.10 (Supp. 3997). See infra notes 121-128 and accompanying text.
15. 1996 La. Acts No. 41, § 1; 1995 La. Acts No. 1208, § 1. See infra notes 129-138 and
accompanying text.
16. 1996 La. Acts No. 41, § 1.
17. In re Rubicon, Inc., 670 So. 2d 475 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1996).
18. 1995 La. Acts No. 1324,§ 1.
19.. 1995 La. Acts No. 1057, § 1, amending La. R.S. 49:951(7) (Supp. 1997).
20. 1995 La. Acts No. 1005, § 1, amending La. R.S. 49:971(A) (Supp. 1997).
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fees as to levy taxes." It applies to "[a]ny new fee or civil fine or [any] increase
in an existing fee or civil fine imposed or assessed by the state or any ...
department;" 8 the only exception covers fees imposed by a "department which is
constitutionally created and headed by an officer who is elected by majority vote
of the electorate of the state."2' The 1995 amendment mandates that any fee
covered by its provisions must be enacted by "a law [passed] by a two-thirds vote
of the elected members of each house of the legislature."24
The statutory changes regarding fees that were enacted in 1995 amended
Louisiana's Administrative Procedure Act, not the Environmental Quality Act.
Although the Administrative Procedure Act excludes agency decisions regarding
fees from the statutory definition of a rule,25 Act 1057 amended the Act to make
"the procedures for adoption of rules and of emergency rules" applicable to the
adoption of fees "[e]xcept where the context clearly provides otherwise."2' In
addition, another amendment to the Administrative Procedure Act generally
prohibits agencies from changing the formula for computing any fee "in a manner
that would increase the fee paid by any person by more than five percent of the
relevant fee paid by such person in the previous fiscal year.""
Act 1057 also amended the Administrative Procedure Act to provide for a
legislative committee to oversee any fee increase proposed by an agency. If a
legislative oversight committee finds a proposed fee change "unacceptable," the
agency may not change the fee.' Of course, the constitutional amendment
described above2 effectively moots this provision because it requires affirmative
legislative action before a new or increased fee is imposed.
B. Rulemaking
During the 1995 regular session, the legislature enacted several laws relating
to agency rulemaking. The legislature required preparation of a risk-assessment
analysis for all rules of the Department of Environmental Quality. 30 It also
21. See La. Const art. VII, § 2 (requiring a two-thirds vote of the legislature to levy any tax).
It is still more difficult to levy taxes, however, because the legislature can consider taxes only in
special sessions or in the regular legislative sessions held during even-numbered years. See La.
Cost. art. Ill, § 2(AX2).
22. La. Cost. art. VII. § 2.1(a) (1995).
23. Id. § 2.1(b). The departments that fall within the exception are State, Justice, Treasury,
Agriculture, Insurance, and Elections and Registration. See id. art. I1l, §§ 7-12.
24. Id. art. VII, § 2.1(a).
25. La. R.S. 49:951(6) (Supp. 1997). The definition in the federal Administrative Procedure
Act contains no comparable exclusion. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(4).
26. La. R.S. 49:951(7) (Supp. 1997).
27. La. R.S. 49:971(AX3) (Supp. 1997), as amended by 1995 La. Acts No. 1005, § I.
28. La. R.S. 49:971(A) (Supp. 1997), as amended by 1995 La, Acts No. 1057, § 1.
29. La. Cost. art. VII, § 2.1. See supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text.
30. La. P.S. 49:953(0) (Supp. 1997), added by 1995 La. Acts No. 642, § 1. See infra notes
34-38 and accompanying text.
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amended the procedures for issuing rules that are identical to federal rules;3
imposed an additional requirement on agencies that issue emergency rules; and
expanded the authority of the legislature 2 and legislative oversight commit-
tees33 to override agency rulemaking decisions.
Although the duty to prepare a risk analysis is contained in an amendment
to the Administrative Procedure Act, the new duty only applies to rules issued
by the Department of Environmental Quality."' Moreover, the duty applies to
all policies, standards, and regulations issued by the department except when the
department's action is "required for compliance with a federal law or regulation;"
is "identical to a federal law or regulation;" will "cost the state and affected
persons less than one million dollars, in the aggregate, to implement;" or is
issued as "an emergency rule."3S
- The Act appears to require the department to publish two risk-assessment
documents for each rule that follows the normal rulemaking process. The
department must publish a report of its risk assessment (or a summary of the
report) in the Louisiana Register "prior to or concurrent with publishing notice
of any proposed policy, standard, or regulation" and also "prior to promulgating
any policy, standard, or final regulation."' 6 No "regulation" covered by the
amendment is "effective" until the secretary complies with the publication
requirement.
37
The statute also prescribes the content of the assessment report. The report
must include four components: a "statement identifying the specific risks being
addressed... and any published, peer-reviewed scientific literature used by the
department to characterize the risks"; a "comparative analysis of the risks...
relative to other risks of a similar or analogous nature to which the public is
routinely exposed"; an "analysis based on published, readily available peer-
reviewed scientific literature, describing how [the department's action] will
advance the purpose of protecting human health or the environment against the
31. La. R.S. 49:953(F) (Supp. 1997), added by 1995 La. Acts No. 512, § I. See infra notes
39-50 and accompanying text.
32. La. R.S. 49:969(Supp. 1997), as amended by 1995 La. ActsNo. 1109,§ i. See infra notes
51.54, 56-57 and accompanying text.
33. La. R.S. 49:953(BX4) (Supp. 1997), added by 1995 La. Acts No. 1057, § 1. See infra note
55 and accompanying text.
34. La. R.S. 49:953(G) (Supp. 1997), added by 1995 La. Acts No. 642, § 1.
35. La. R.S. 49:953(GX3) (Supp. 1997). A departmental policy, standard, or regulation is
"identical" to a federal law or regulation when "the proposed rule has the same content and meaning
as the corresponding federal law or regulation." La. R.S. 49:953(GX4) (Supp. 1997).
36. La. R.S. 49:953(GXI) (Supp. 1997). The statute does not expressly authorize the
department to use the same report for a final rule as it uses for a proposed rule, but that approach
is probably permissible unless the responses to the proposed rule reveal major deficiencies in the
original report. However, the statute does direct the department to "consider any scientific and
economic studies or data timely provided by interested parties which are relevant" to the matter
addressed in the report and to "the proposed policy, standard, or regulation being considered." La.
R.S. 49:953(GX5) (Supp. 1997).
37. La. R.S. 49:953(GX2) (Supp. 1997).
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specified identified risks"; and an "analysis and statement that ... [the
department's action] presents the most cost-effective method practically
achievable to produce the benefits intended regarding the risks identified."38
Act 512 of the 1995 regular session is another amendment to the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act that applies only to the Department of Environmental
Quality.3 9 It prescribes an alternate procedure that the department "may use"
when the secretary "proposes a rule that is identical to a federal law or regulation
applicable in Louisiana."' However, the department may not use these
procedures "for the adoption of any rules creating or increasing fees.""
The special procedure for rules identical to federal rules has eight steps the
department must follow:
(1) publication of a notice of the proposed rule in the Louisiana
Register at least sixty days prior to taking action on the rule; 2
(2) submission of the notice of the proposed rule and the complete
text to the Louisiana Register at least seventy days before the date the
department proposes to adopt the rule;'3
(3) mailing of notice of the intent to adopt the rule "to all persons
who have made timely request for such notice";"
(4) establishment of a comment period "of not less than thirty
days";
4
38. La. R.S. 49:953(GXIXa)-(d) (Supp. 1997).
39. La. KLS. 49:953(FX3) (Supp. 1997).
40. Id. The amendment to subsection 953(F)(3) does not define the term identical, but the 1995
addition of subsection 953(G) does contain such a definition for purposes of that subsection. See
supra note 35.
41. La. R.S. 49:953(FX4) (Supp. 1997). This reference is somewhat confusing. The
Administrative Procedure Act excludes fees from the definition of "rule," but it requires the agency
to follow the procedures applicable to rules unless the context clearly indicates otherwise. See supra
notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
42. La. R.S. 49:953(F)(3Xa) (Supp. 1997). The notice must include five elements:
(i) A statement of either the terms or substance of the intended action or a description
of the subjects and issues involved.
(ii) A statement that no fiscal or economic impact will result from the proposed rule.
(iii) The name of the person within the department who has responsibility for
responding to inquiries about the intended action.
(iv) The time, place, and manner in which interested persons may present their views
thereon including the notice for a public hearing ....
(v) A statement that the intended action complies with the law administered by the
department, including a citation of the specific provision, or provisions, of law which
authorize the rule.
43. La. .S. 49:953(FX3)(b) (Supp. 1997). The office of the state register need not publish the
complete rule if publication "would be unduly cumbersome, expensive, or otherwise inexpedient."
In such a case, the office must include in the Louisiana Register "a notice stating the general subject
matter of the omitted proposed rule, the process being employed by the department for adoption of
the proposed rule. and [an explanation of] how a copy of the proposed rule may be obtained."
44. La. R.S. 49:953(FX3)(c) (Supp. 1997).
45. La. K.S. 49:953(FX3)(e) (Supp. 1997).
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(5) availability "to all interested persons" of "copies of the
proposed rule from the time the notice of its adoption is published in
the Louisiana Register";'
(6) a written response from the department "describing the
principal reasons for and against adoption of any amendments or
changes suggested in the written comments and submissions and
specifically addressing any assertion that the proposed rule is not
identical to the federal law or regulation upon which it is based";'7
(7) certification from the department, "under oath, ... that the
proposed rule is identical to a specified federal law or regulation
applicable in Louisiana";"8 and
(8) adoption of the rule "no earlier than sixty days, nor later than
twelve months, after the official notice of the proposed rule was
published in the Louisiana Register."9
A rule adopted pursuant to the new procedures is not subject to legislative
oversight unless oversight is "specifically requested, in writing," by the chair of
a legislative oversight committee.' °
A third statute passed by the 1995 legislature, Act 1057, amended the
subsections of the Administrative Procedure Act regarding emergency rules and
legislative oversight."' Unlike the provisions described above, the provisions
of Act 1057 apply to all rules, not just those issued by the Department of
Environmental Quality. The amendment requires the agency to prepare and to
publish a statement identifying the "specific reasons" why an emergency rule is
necessary" and provides for special legislative 3 and judicials' oversight of
emergency rules. In addition, Act 1057 amended the provision providing for
legislative review of agency rules to forbid an agency from proposing "a rule
change or emergency rule that is the same or substantially similar" to a proposed
rule that has been disapproved "within four months" after the disapproval, or
46. La. R.S. 49:953(FX3Xt) (Supp. 1997). This language appears imprecise. The legislature
surely meant for the rules to be available from the time of their proposal, not their adoption.
47. La. R.S. 49:953(FX3)(g) (Supp. 1997).
48. La. R.S. 49:953(F)(3)b) (Supp. 1997). The certification must go to the governor, the
attorney general, the speaker of the House of Representatives, the president of the Senate, the chair
of the legislative oversight. committees, and to the office of the state register. The department must
also furnish the oversight committees with "its response to comments and submissions."
49. La. R.S. 49:953(F)(3)(j) (Supp. 1997). Subsection (j) also contains a proviso the meaning
of which is not clear: "the proposed rule shall be effective upon its publication in the Louisiana
Register, said publication to be subsequent to the act of adoption." Id. (emphasis added).
50. La. R.S. 49:953(FX3)() (Supp. 1997).
51. 1995 La. Acts No. 1057, amending La. R.S. 49:953(B), 968(G) (Supp. 1997).
52. 1995 La. Acts No. 1057.
53. La. R.S. 49:953(BX4) (Supp. 1997).
54. La. R.S. 49:953(BX3) (Supp. 1997).
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from proposing such a rule "more than once during the interim between regular
sessions of the legislature."' 5
A fourth 1995 statute extended the legislature's authority to veto, to amend,
or to suspend rules and fees adopted by a state agency. Like Act 1057, it applies
to rules issued by all agencies. The new statute allows the legislature to alter
agency rules and fees by adoption of "any Concurrent Resolution," 6 which is
not subject to veto by the governor."'
C. Adjudications
Another amendment to the Administrative Procedure Act made major
changes in the way that adjudications are conducted in the Department of
Environmental Quality. Act 739 created a new division of administrative law,
the Department of State Civil Service," and granted the division responsibility
for commencing and handling "all" adjudications after October 1, 1996."
Despite this inclusive language, the new law does contain some exemptions. In
addition to specific exemptions applicable to particular administrative bodies,'
the statute includes a general exemption for "(a]ny. .. agency which is required,
pursuant to a federal mandate and as a condition of federal funding, to conduct
or to render a final order in an adjudication proceeding ... to the extent of the
federal mandate."6'
Act 739 provides for the appointment of administrative law judges to preside
over adjudications. The new division in the Department of State Civil Service
is, in turn, the employer of the administrative law judges. The head of the
division is a director' whose responsibilities include hiring, assigning, and
evaluating the administrative law judges. 3
The most important change made by Act 739 is to give the administrative
law judge the power to make the final administrative decision. In all cases
involving an adjudication, the decision of the administrative law judge is "final."
Neither the Department of Environmental Quality nor the secretary can reverse
the decision or direct the administrative law judge to reconsider it.'4 Presum-
55. La. KS$. 49:968(G) (Supp. 1997), as amended by 1995 La. Acts No. 1057, § 1.
56. La. ILS. 49:969 (Supp. 1997), as amended by 1995 La. Acts No. 1109, § 1. But see INS
v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983) (holding federal legislative veto unconstitutional
as violation of separation of powers established by the United States Constitution).
57. La. Const. art. 111, § 17.
58. 1995 La. Acts No. 739, § 1, adding La. I-S. 49:991-99 (Supp. 1997).
59. La. I.S. 49:991 (Supp. 1997).
60. La. R.S. 49:992(DX3)-(7) (Supp. 1997). The exemptions apply to "the office of worker's
compensation administration," the "office of employment security," all "state professional and
occupational licensing boards," the "Department of Agriculture," and the commissioner ofconservation.
61. La. IKS. 49:992(DX2) (Supp. 1997).
62. La. K.S. 49:996 (Supp. 1997).
63. La. K-S. 49:997 (Supp. 1997).
64. La. K.S. 49:992(BX2) (Supp. 1997).
19971
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ably, however, the department is an "aggrieved person" entitled to seek judicial
review of the decision of the administrative law judge."
The new chapter of the Administrative Procedure Act contains other
substantive provisions as well. It establishes the general qualifications and
powers of administrative law judges.' It also contains more specific provisions
relating to prehearing conferences,67 ex parte communications," and withdraw-
al and disqualification of administrative law judges."
In the same session in which the legislature enacted Act 739, it added a new
chapter on administrative enforcement and judicial review to the Environmental
Quality Act.70 The new chapter contains extensive provisions regarding
adjudicatory hearings. Recognizing that inconsistencies existed between this
statute and Act 739, the legislature provided that Act 739 controlled in cases of
conflict."'
Some obvious inconsistencies do exist in the two statutes. First, Act 739
changes the name of the individuals responsible for conducting adjudicatory
hearings from "hearing officers" to "administrative law judges."' Second, the
responsibility for hiring and supervising administrative law judges shifts from the
Secretary of the Department of Environmental Quality to the Secretary of the
Department of State Civil Service.' Third and most important, the new chapter
of the Environmental Quality Act allows the secretary to make the final
administrative decision following an adjudicatory hearing, while the amendment
to the Administrative Procedure Act gives the administrative law judge final
decision making authority.'
Other provisions of the new chapter on enforcement procedures and judicial
review seem supplementary to Act 739. Section 2050.4 prescribes the form and
content for requesting an adjudicatory hearing;" it also grants the respondent
a right to an adjudicatory hearing on a compliance order or penalty assessment"
and gives the secretary discretion to grant an adjudicatory hearing when one is
requested by any other aggrieved person." Section 2050.11 covers intervention
65. See La. R.S. 30:2050.21(A) (Supp. 1997) (allowing judicial review of any final permit
action, declaratory ruling, or enforcement action), 2004(8) (1989) (defining "person" to include "the
state of Louisiana (and) political subdivisions of the state of Louisiana").
66. La. K-S. 49:994(A)-(D) (Supp. 1997).
67. La. R.S. 49:998(A)-(E) (Supp. 1997).
68. La. R.S. 49:998(F) (Supp. 1997).
69. La. R.S. 49:999 (Supp. 1997).
70. 1995 La. Acts No. 947, § I, adding La. R.S. 30:2050.1-.29 (Supp. 1997).
71. 1995 La. Acts No. 947, § 8.
72. Compare La. RKS. 49:994 (Supp. 1997) with La. R.S. 30:2050.13 (Supp. 1997).
73. Compare La. KS. 49:994(A), 995, 997 (Supp. 1997) with La. R.S. 30:2050.13, .14(C)
(Supp. 1997).
74. Compare La. R.S. 49:992(BX2) (Supp. 1997) with La. K.S. 30:2050.17 (Supp. 1997).
75. La. K.S. 30:2050.4(B), (D) (Supp. 1997).
76. La. K.S. 30:2050.4(A) (Supp. 1997).
77. La. ILS. 30:2050.4(B) (Supp. 1997).
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in enforcement proceedings," withdrawal of requests for hearings,7 and
timing of a public hearing held in conjunction with an adjudicatory hearing.'
Finally, the new chapter directs the secretary to issue rules "requiring that the
record of adjudication be assembled in a uniform and consistent order and
contain those things listed by the Administrative Procedure Act."'"
Litigation may be necessary to decide if a final group of provisions are
supplementary to, or inconsistent with, the provisions of Act 739. The new
chapter in the Environmental Quality Act prescribes special qualifications and
ethical standards for hearing officers in environmental cases,8 2 and defines the
powers of a hearing officer during the hearing." In addition, it allows the
secretary (not the hearing officer) to limit the scope of an adjudicatory hearing
to questions of law and disputed questions of fact" and to stay compliance
orders pending resolution of judicial appeals."
D. Permits
The most important development with respect to permit procedures was the
legislature's failure to adopt the permit provisions of the law institute proposal.
Opposition to the permit provisions of the proposal contributed to the legisla-
ture's decision to defer action on the law institute bill in 1994. When the
legislature returned to the subject in 1995, it substituted a bill from which the
permit provisions had been deleted for the law institute bill.
Some significant procedural constraints already exist with respect to permits.
The Environmental Quality Act establishes time limits for various steps in the
permitting process" and grants an applicant the right to seek a de novo hearing
in the Nineteenth Judicial District Court if the secretary refuses to hold an
adjudicatory hearing on a permit application." This later requirement is
particularly significant now that the legislature has transferred the final decision
making authority following an adjudicatory hearing from the secretary to the
administrative law judge."
78. La. R.S. 30:2050.11(B) (Supp. 1997).
79. La. R.S. 30:2050.11(C) (Supp. 1997).
80. La. R.S. 30:2050.11(D) (Supp. 1997). The section also requires that the record of the
public hearing must "be made available to the parties to the adjudicatory hearing." La. ,.S.
30:2050.11(E) (Supp. 1997).
81. La. &S. 30:2050.20 (Supp. 1997).
82. La. P.S. 30:2050.14 (Supp. 1997).
83. La. R.S. 30:2050.15 (Supp. 1997).
84. La. R.S. 30:2050.4(C) (Supp. 1997).
85. a. KS. 30:2050.22(B) (Supp. 1997).
86. La. KS. 30:2022 (Supp. 1997).
87. La. K.S. 30:2024(C) (Supp. 1997). See also La. K-S. 30:2050.29(B) (Supp. 1997) (allowing
a suit for de novo review if the secretary fails to grant a request for an adjudicatory hearing "within
thirty days after the timely filing of the request").




In 1995, the legislature added a chapter on enforcement procedure and
judicial review to the Environmental Quality Act. 9 Basically, the 1995
legislation establishes uniform procedures for handling administrative enforce-
ment actions in all of the divisions of the Department of Environmental Quality.
Unfortunately, however, those procedures are inconsistent in some important
respects with the adjudication provisions that the same legislature enacted in Act
739." In cases of conflict, Act 739 controls.9
The new chapter on enforcement procedures grants additional protections to
the respondent.9" It requires the secretary to establish "policies and procedures
to address violations of (the Act] in a formal and consistent manner"93 as well
as "criteria for the assessment of reasonably consistent department-wide penalties
based upon the factors enumerated in [the Act.]"' The most important change
made by the 1995 amendment is to grant the respondent a right to an adjudicato-
ry hearing on a proposed compliance order or penalty assessment;9 the
secretary may, however, limit the scope of the hearing to any "disputed issue"
of material fact or of law." The new chapter also requires the issuance of a
notice of violation before a penalty is assessed for a violation97 and mandates
that the assistant secretary for legal affairs and enforcement review all compli-
ance orders and penalty assessments "for legal sufficiency" before they are
issued.9" Finally, the 1995 legislation provides that an administrative enforce-
ment action is "abandoned" if the department fails to take any steps to complete
an enforcement action within two years after first issuing a compliance order or
penalty assessment."
The new chapter also contains provisions designed to facilitate public
participation in administrative enforcement actions. The secretary must maintain
"in a place accessible to the public" a list of all administrative enforcement
actions commenced within the preceding twelve months; on a "periodic basis,"
89. 1995 La. Acts No. 947, § i, adding La. R.S. 30:2050.1-.29 (Supp. 1997).
90. See supra notes 58-69 and accompanying text.
91. 1995 La. Acts No. 947, § 8.
92. The respondent is "the person against whom an enforcement action is directed." La. K.S.
30:2004(20) (Supp. 1997), amended by 1995 La. Acts No. 947, § 2.
93. La. R.S. 30:2050.1(A) (Supp. 1997). See also La. R.S. 30:2050.3(A) (Supp. 1997) (duty
to establish "criteria for the assessment of reasonably consistent department-wide penalties based on
the factors enumerated in (the Environmental Quality Act]'). Prior to the 1995 amendment, La. R.S.
30:2025(AX2) appeared to establish a similar obligation, but it has never been enforced in any
judicial decision. See Murchison, supra note 1, at 517.
94. La. R.S. 30:2050.3(A) (Supp. 1997).
95. La. R.S. 30:2050.4(A) (Supp. 1997).
96. La. R.S. 30:2050.4(C) (Supp. 1997).
97. La. R.S. 30:2050.3(B) (Supp. 1997).
98. La. R.S. 30:2050.1(C) (Supp. 1997). Cf La. R.S. 30:2050. 10(A)(5) (Supp. 1997) (imposing
a similar requirement for declaratory orders).
99. La. K.S. 30:2050.9 (Supp. 1997).
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the secretary must mail copies of the list to persons who have requested that they
be placed on the mailing list.'00 When an adjudicatory hearing is held on a
compliance order or penalty assessment, the secretary must provide an
opportunity for public comment "[p]rior to the adjudicatory hearing,"'O' and the
secretary "may" hold "a public hearing... in connection with an adjudicatory
hearing."1° 2 In addition, the secretary must provide for public comment on a
proposed settlement or compromise, 3 and the secretary "may" hold a public
hearing when the "secretary finds significant degree of public interest in the
settlement or compromise."'"
The new chapter provides procedures for four types of administrative
responses to violations of the Environmental Quality Act.' First, the secre-
tary or an assistant secretary may (and must before imposing a penalty) issue a
notice of violation." s Second, the secretary or an assistant secretary may issue
a compliance order.' 0° Third, the secretary or an assistant secretary may assess
a civil penalty."' Fourth, for violations that are "endangering or causing
damage to public health or the environment," the secretary may issue an
emergency cease and desist order.'
Because a notice of violation imposes no judicially enforceable obligation
on a respondent, the procedural requirements for a notice are minimal. It must
"describe with reasonable specificity the nature of the violation and.., advise
the respondent that further enforcement action may be taken if compliance is not
promptly achieved.""' Before a penalty can be imposed administratively, the
secretary or an assistant secretary must issue a notice of violation that advises
"the respondent that the assessment of a penalty is under consideration" and must
also provide ten days for the filing of written comments."'
The new chapter establishes a common procedure for issuing compli-
ance orders and assessing penalties. The secretary or assistant secretary issues
the order or assessment." 2 Within thirty days, the respondent may de-
100. La. P.S. 30:2050.1(B) (Supp. 1997).
101. La. R.S. 30:2050.4() (Supp. 1997).
102. La. ILS. 30:2050.12(A) (Supp. 1997).
103. La. K.S. 30:2050.7(B) (Supp. 1997).
104. La. R.S. 30:2050.7(D) (Supp. 1997).
105. For a description of the various administrative enforcement options, see Murchison. supra
note 1, at 515-39.
106. La. RKS. 30:2050.2(A), .3(B)(1) (Supp. 1997).
107. La. R.S. 30:2050.2(A), .25(B), .26 (Supp. 1997).
108. La. R.S. 30:2050.3(C), .25(B), .26 (Supp. 1997).
109. La. K-S. 30:2050.8 (Supp. 1997).
110. La. R.S. 30:2050.2(A) (Supp. 1997).
111. La. K.S. 30:2050.3(B) (Supp. 1997).
112. La. R.S. 30:2050.2(A), .3(3), .25(B), .26 (Supp. 1997). A compliance order must describe
"with reasonable specificity the nature of the violation," include "a timetable for achieving
compliance," "[n]otify the respondent of the right to an adjudicatory hearing," and "(a]dvise the
respondent that civil penalties may be assessed for a violation." La. R.S. 30:2050.2(B) (Supp. 1997).
A penalty assessment must "[d]escribe, with reasonable specificity, the violation that gives rise to the
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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
mand'" (and any "aggrieved party" may request'""4) an adjudicatory hearing.
Following the adjudicatory hearing, the chapter provides that the secretary makes
the final administrative decision; obviously, however, this last provision conflicts
with the provisions of the new chapter of the Administrative Procedure Act that
is described above."'
The secretary's power to issue an emergency cease and desist order is quite
broad. The secretary has discretion to issue the order without holding a hearing;
the order is "effective upon the signing of the order"; and the respondent must
comply with it "immediately upon receiving knowledge of the order."".6 The
chapter limits the secretary's broad power in two ways: the order expires in
fifteen days,"' and the respondent may file an immediate action for injunctive
relief."'
The new enforcement chapter also addresses other matters. It allows the
secretary to establish "informal procedures" for compliance orders and penalty
assessments, but those procedures may only be used with the consent of the
respondent." 9 In addition, it allows the secretary to compromise or to settle
compliance orders and to compromise or to settle penalty assessments "with the
concurrence of the attorney general."'20
F. Declaratory Rulings
The Administrative Procedure Act authorizes administrative agencies to issue
declaratory orders regarding the applicability of statutes and rules to specific
factual situations.'2' However, the decision to grant a declaratory order is
discretionary with the agency, and-like most (probably all) state agencies-the
Department of Environmental Quality has never even adopted any rules for
issuing declaratory orders. The law institute proposal for reforming the
procedures of the Department, of Environmental Quality required the secretary
penalty," state "the amount of the penalty," and "[n]otify the respondent of the right to an
adjudicatory hearing." La. R.S. 30:2050.3(C)(2) (Supp. 1997).
113. La. R.S. 30:2050.4(A) (Supp. 1997).
114. La. ILS. 30:2050.4(B) (Supp. 1997). The secretary has discretion to grant the request
"when equity and justice require." Id.
115. La. R.S. 49:992(BX2) (Supp. 1997). See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
116. La. R.S. 30:2050.8(A), (C) (Supp. 1997). An emergency cease and desist order must
"[d]escribe with specificity the activity occurring at the facility or the site that is endangering or
causing damage to public health or the environment," identify the particular "threat to public health
or the environment that the activity presents," and "[s]pecify the measures that the owner or operator
of the facility or the site is directed to undertake immediately in order to abate or to eliminate the
danger or the damage to public health or the environment." La. R.S. 30:2050.8(B) (Supp. 1997).
117. La. R.S. 30:2050.8(D) (Supp. 1997). To extend an order beyond fifteen days, the secretary
may file an action for declaratory relief. La. R.S. 30:2050.8(E) (Supp. 1997).
118. La. R.S. 30:2050.8(F) (Supp. 1997).
119. La. R.S. 30:2050.6(A) (Supp. 1997).
120. La. R.S. 30:2050.7(A) (Supp. 1997).
121. La. R.S. 49:962 (1987).
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to issue rules for declaratory rulings, and the legislature included the declaratory
ruling section in the 1995 legislation that added a chapter on enforcement
procedure and judicial review to the Environmental Quality Act."
The direct burden imposed on the Department of Environmental Quality by
the 1995 legislation is relatively modest. The statute requires the secretary to
issue rules for issuing declaratory orders and prescribes some minimum
requirements; however, the content of the rules is largely left to the discretion of
the secretary." The secretary may modify a previous declaratory ruling, but
the modification only applies prospectively.'"
Any person with "a real and actual interest" in a matter may petition for a
declaratory ruling.'2 The secretary must respond to the petition within sixty
days, but the secretary has discretion as to whether to issue a declaratory
ruling."u If the secretary declines to issue a declaratory ruling, the petitioner
may "proceed" with an action for a declaratory judgment under the Administra-
tive Procedure Act or the Code of Civil Procedure.'" If the secretary issues
a declaratory ruling, the ruling is a final agency action that can be appealed by
any "aggrieved person."'1'
G. Judicial Review
In 1995, the legislature enacted conflicting provisions regarding judicial
review. Act 947 provided for appeals of permit actions, declaratory rulings, and
enforcement actions in the First Circuit Court of Appeal.' 29 However, Act
1208 provided for review in the Nineteenth Judicial District Court.' 0
Aware of the conflicting provisions in the bills that became Acts 947 and
1208, the legislature provided that those of Act 1208 would control if both bills
122. La. R.S. 30:2050.10 (Supp. 1997).
123. La. R.S. 30:2050.10(A) (Supp. 1997). The rules must include six elements:
(I) The form, content, and filing of a petition....
(2) The procedural rights of the person seeking a declaratory ruling.
(3) The disposition of the petition.
(4) A fee, to be paid by the petitioner, sufficient to defray the expenses of issuing the
ruling.
(5) Concurrence as to legal sufficiency by the assistant secretary for legal affairs and
enforcement.
(6) A requirement that the secretary shall maintain, in a place accessible to the public,
a list of all petitions for declaratory rulings that have been filed.
Id.
124. La. P.S. 30:2050.10(G) (Supp. 1997).
125. La. K.S. 30:2050.10(B) (Supp. 1997).
126. La. K.S. 30:2050.10(C) (Supp. 1997).
127. Id.
128. La. I.S. 30:2050.10(F), 2050.21(A) (Supp. 1997). See infra notes 129-138 and
accompanying text.
129. 1995 La. Acts No. 947, § 1, enacting La. ILS. 30:2050.21(A) (Supp. 1997).
130. 1995 La. Acts No. 1208, § 2, amending La. R.S. 30:2024(C) (Supp. 1997).
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were enacted into law.'' The first circuit temporarily frustrated this intent
when it held that Act 1208 was unconstitutional, 2 but the legislature reestab-
lished judicial review in the district court in the 1996 special session.'
Following the 1996 amendment, the Environmental Quality Act allows any
"aggrieved person" to appeal a final permit action, declaratory ruling, or
enforcement action to the Nineteenth Judicial District Court." It also permits
the respondent to appeal a penalty suspensively' and allows the secretary or
the district court to stay a compliance order while a judicial appeal is pend-
ing.'36 Although the district court is authorized to promulgate rules of
procedure for appeals,' the court's review is "confined to the record of
adjudication," and the Administrative Procedure Act provides the "standard of
review.'
13
II. SIGNIFICANCE OF-THE CHANGES
More important than cataloguing the recent changes is assessing their impact.
The section that follows offers an individualized analysis of the various changes.
The final section appraises the changes as a whole.
A. Fees
Arguably, the constitutional amendment regarding assessment of fees 39 is
the most important of the recent changes. Over time, the amendment is likely
to reduce the funds available for environmental regulation enforcement. This
prospect is particularly ominous in light of the continuing reduction in the funds
available from the federal government.
As a practical matter, the new constitutional provision will grant the
regulated community a veto authority over future fee increases. One-third of the
members of either house of the legislature can block any new fee or any increase
in an existing fee, and the entities subject to environmental regulation have
always had more legislative influence than would be necessary to assemble that
minority. As a result, future secretaries are likely to limit themselves to
increases that the regulated industry concludes will inure to its benefit. Surely,
131. 1995 La. Acts No. 947, § 8.
132. In re Rubicon, Inc., 670 So. 2d 475 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1996).
133. 1996 La. Acts No. 41, § 1 (First Extraordinary Session). The legislature made the change
retroactive, and the first circuit sustained the constitutionality of the retroactivity provision. In re
Angus Chem. Co., 679 So. 2d 454 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1996).
134. La. R.S. 30:2050.21(A) (Supp. 1997).
135. La. R.S. 30:2050.22(A) (Supp. 1997).
136. La. R.S. 30:2050.22(B) (Supp. 1997).
137. La. R.S. 30:2050.21(B) (Supp. 1997).
138. La. R.S. 30:2050.21(C) (Supp. 1997). See La. R.S. 49:964(F) (1987) (Administrative
Procedure Act provisions regarding standard of review in judicial appeals).
139. La. Const. art. VII, § 2.1. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
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one does not have to be too great a cynic to classify as minimal the likelihood
that the regulated community will conclude that stricter regulations or more
vigorous enforcement of existing regulations will provide such benefits.
Evidence of the likely consequences of a more cooperative attitude towards
polluters is already available. The department's recent statistics indicate a
decline in the number of enforcement actions." Unfortunately, the trend will
probably continue now that new funds for environmental initiatives require a
superlegislative majority.
In one very important respect, the new amendment is ambiguous: To what
extent does its requirement of legislative approval for "[any new... civil fine"
limit the secretary's ability to impose civil penalties? Obviously, the department
imposes a "new" penalty every time it levies a penalty for a violation. If the
requirement for approval by a supermajority of the legislature applies to every
penalty, the constitutional amendment will effectively eliminate administrative
imposition of penalties, a change that was never advertised if it was intended by
the sponsors.
One can suggest two ways that the courts could avoid this unfortunate
consequence. The courts could exclude penalties from the definition of what
constitutes a "civil fine," but that construction seems to render the constitutional
language meaningless. A preferable approach would limit the constitutional
language to quasi-legislative actions of prescribing fees and fines to a category
of activities. This construction of the amendment would hold the new
requirement for legislative approval inapplicable when an agency acts in a quasi-
judicial capacity to apply an existing fee or fine structure to a particular
individual. Under this construction, the administrative assessment of a civil
penalty would be a quasi-judicial action to which the constitutional amendment
does not apply.
One may reasonably anticipate that Louisiana's appellate courts will avoid
a construction of the Environmental Quality Act that would effectively eliminate
administrative enforcement. Unfortunately, the ambiguity of the statute gives
those who violate environmental regulations another argument to use to try to
prevent the department from imposing some financial cost on those who violate
the statute.
The recent statutory provisions relating to fees pale into insignificance in
light of the constitutional amendment. The requirement that the secretary use
rulemaking procedures for establishing or changing fees, the limitations on the
amounts that fees can be increased, and the expanded provision for legislative
oversight are obviously moot now that a supermajority of the legislature must
approve all new and increased fees.
The new constitutional requirement is likely to limit severely the funds
available to protect the environment. For the last two decades, Louisiana has




relied on fees rather than general revenues to fund the Department of Environ-
mental Quality. Unless the legislature now chooses to commit other funds for
environmental protection, the prospects for new regulatory initiatives or an
increased enforcement effort seem bleak.
B. Rulemaking
The new procedural hurdles for rulemaking are likely to produce a result
similar to the new requirements for imposing fees: The secretary will issue
fewer rules. Although the limitations the new statutes impose are procedural
rather than substantive, their combined impact will make it substantially more
difficult for the secretary to adopt new rules. The new risk-assessment
requirement,"' the increased specificity required to justify emergency
rules,"' and the legislature's expanded authority to overturn rules'43 individu-
ally and (especially) collectively make it more difficult for the secretary to issue
new rules. Even the alternate procedure for rules identical to federal rules that
apply in the state'" imposes a complicated set of steps with which the
secretary must comply, although it does appear to permit the secretary to
dispense with the duty to prepare a risk-assessment analysis. At a minimum, the
new requirements will force the agency to devote additional personnel hours to
each rule. The inevitable result will be fewer rules, an ironic result in light of
the deadlines for issuing rules required to implement the new chapter on
administrative enforcement.'*s
The new mandate to prepare a risk-assessment analysis for every proposed
and final rule has the greatest potential for frustrating new regulatory initiatives.
The regulated community is certain to argue that the risk-assessment requirement
imposes substantive limits on the secretary's discretion. Even if the courts take
a more deferential attitude toward the new risk assessments, one can confidently
predict that opponents of every controversial rule will have another ground for
challenging it.
The risk-assessment requirement is likely to deter the adoption of new rules in
at least three ways. First, emphasizing the duty to rely on readily available "peer-
reviewed scientific literature"'"6 may delay action until after the existence of
definite harm has been conclusively established, an approach that conflicts with the
preventive approach for protecting the environment." 7 Second, the additional
141. La. RLS. 49:953(0) (Supp. 1997). See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
142. La. L.S. 49:953(B) (Supp. 1997). See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
143. LA. R.S. 49:953(B), 968(G), 969 (Supp. 1997). See supra notes 53, 55-57 and accompany-
ing text.
144. La. R.S. 49:953(FX3) (Supp. 1997). See supra notes 39-50 and accompanying text.
145. See, e.g., 1995 La. Acts No. 947, § 4.
146. La. R.S. 49:953(GXIXa), (c) (Supp. 1997).
147. See, e.g., La. R.S. 30:2074(BX1), 2052, 2154(A)(3), 2192(B)(2) (1989). Cf 33 U.S.c.
1251(a) (1994); 42 U.S.C. §§ 6924(d), (e), (g), 6973, 7409(b), 7412(b)(2) (1994). See Kenneth M.
[Vol. 57
KENNETH M. MURCHISON
work required to prepare the risk-assessment--especially when combined with the
loss of the ability to impose fees sufficient to cover the costs of the assess-
ments"4-will reduce the number of rules that can be issued. Third, the new
requirement gives the regulated community an additional ground (independent of
the substantive justification for the rule) to delay rules by arguing that the secretary
has not discharged the new procedural duty. One can reasonably anticipate judicial
challenges based on every aspect of the risk analysis provision: whether the
department has adequately identified "the specific risks being addressed" and the
readily available "published, peer-reviewed scientific literature,"" 9 and whether
the department has explained the comparative risk being addressed "relative to
other risks of a similar or analogous nature to which the public is routinely
exposed;"' the way in which the rule will "advance the purpose of protecting
human health or the environment against the specified identified risks;"'' and the
basis for concluding that the rule "presents the most cost-effective method
practically achievable to produce the benefits intended regarding the risks
identified."" When faced with potential challenges from a well-financed
regulated entity, the secretary is likely to limit future rulemaking to cases where
harm has already occurred and been documented in the scientific literature.
How severe the discouragement to new rules will be depends on how the courts
interpret the new requirement. Although the Louisiana Supreme Court's opinion
in Save Ourselves, Inc. v. Louisiana Environmental Control CommissionIS3
requires the secretary to prepare a risk analysis before making certain decisions, the
courts have generally deferred to the secretary's determination of how detailed the
analysis should be.'3 If the courts take a similarly deferential attitude to the risk-
assessment duty imposed by the legislature, the substantive impact will be modest.
On the other hand, the impact will be great if the courts decide that the new
legislative mandate requires them to second guess the secretary's decision about
what constitutes an adequate assessment of the risks posed by an activity for which
regulations are being proposed.
Even if the courts limit the substantive impact of the new risk-assessment
requirement, the very existence of the obligation will still deter the secretary from
issuing new rules. Documenting (and redocumenting before a final rule is issued)
will be time consuming, and spending more time on each rule without increased
Murchison, Environmental Law In Australia and the United States: A Comparative Overview (Part
H), I I Envtl. L & Plan. J. 254, 255 (1994); see generally James Cameron & Julie Abouchar, The
Precaudonwy Principle: A Fundamental Principle of Law and Policy for the Protection of the
Global Environment, 14 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 1 (1991).
148. La. Const. art. VU, § 2.1. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
149. La. K.S. 49:953(GXIXa) (Supp. 1997).
150. La. K.S. 49:963(0XI)(b) (Supp. 1997).
151. La. IKS. 49:963(GXIXc) (Supp. 1997).
152. La. R.S. 49:963(GXIXd) (Supp. 1997).
153. 452 So. 2d 1152 (La. 1984).




funding means that fewer rules will be issued. Moreover, in some areas, the
scholarly literature may be so vast that mastering it will make the delay permanent
in fact if not in theory.
The other new statutory provisions are also likely to delay and to deter new
rules. The new procedures that the secretary can use when adopting state rules
identical to existing federal rules"5 are so cumbersome as to defeat the basic
purpose of expediting the adoption of rules that do not alter the underlying
substantive law. Similarly, the requirement for more precise justifications for
emergency rules"5 are likely to make agencies less inclined to respond immedi-
ately to threats to public health or the environment. Finally, broader authority for
the legislature to override rules"57 will also deter the secretary from using the
rulemaking process in controversial cases.
C. Adjudications
The 1995 legislative changes relating to the way adjudications are conducted
in Louisiana will drastically alter the way the Department of Environmental Quality
does business. In the past, the department has regularly used adjudications to
resolve specific controversies. The new statutes may encourage the department to
seek other methods for resolving some of those disputes.
The least controversial aspects of the changes relate to the status ofadministra-
tive law judges. Calling those who preside at adjudications administrative law
judges instead of hearing officers 5' may enhance their prestige, and it may create
some confusion about the extent of their powers; but it does not alter their
authority." 9 On the other hand, the transfer of appointing and supervising
authority to the Department of State Civil Service" was a modest, but desirable
change. Although no one has offered any evidence of improper secretarial
influence over a hearing officer, making the hearing officer subject to the
supervision of the secretary did create at least the appearance of departmental
influence. The change will be unfortunate, however, if the courts construe the
provisions of the Environmental Quality Act relating to the qualifications and
powers of hearing officers and the mechanics of conducting hearings' 6' as
155. La. R.S. 49:953(FX3) (Supp. 1997). See supra notes 39-50 and accompanying text.
156. La. R.S. 49:953(B) (Supp. 1997). See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
157. La. R.S. 49:953(BX4), 968(G) (Supp. 1997). See supra notes 53, 55-57 and accompanying
text.
158. La. R.S. 49:994 (Supp. 1997). See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
159. As the second circuit has recently emphasized, administrative hearing officers are not
"judges" even when they are denominated "administrative law judges." Walker v. Conagra Food
Services, 671 So. 2d 1218 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1996).
160. La. ILS. 49:991 (Supp. 1997).
161. La. R.S. 30:2050.14. .15 (Supp. 1997). Interestingly, the requirement that hearing officers
in the Department of Environmental Quality be familiar with the underlying scientific principles and
the relevant legal framework antedated the new chapter on environmental enforcement procedures
and judicial review. See La. R.S. 30:2018(B) (1989), repealed by 1995 La. Acts No. 947, § 3.
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inconsistent with the new chapter on adjudications in the Administrative Procedure
Act."6
The most pernicious of the changes concerning adjudications is the provision
transferring the final administrative decision in contested cases to the administra-
tive law judge. In essence, the legislature has transferred final administrative
authority from the politically accountable head of the department to an
administrative law judge who is (or, at least, should be) immune from political
influence and who may well be ignorant of the scientific basis of the underlying
controversy'" as well as the impact of the decision on other programs of the
department. For the Department of Environmental Quality, the new provision
seriously compromises the secretary's position as head of the department that is
"the primary agency in the state concerned with environmental protection and
regulation."'" In the Save Ourselves decision,'63 the supreme court declared
that this position imposed special responsibilities on the secretary to implement
the constitutional commitment to protection of the state's natural resources.'"
The loss of decision making authority is particularly critical in permit cases
where the legislature has reinforced the constitutional mandate by directing that
the secretary is to "act as the primary public trustee of the environment" when
making decisions "relative to the granting or denying of permits."' 6'
Making the administrative law judge responsible for the final administrative
decision also dramatically alters the process for reaching administrative decisions
in contested cases. Since the Environmental Control Commission was abolished
in 1983,'" assistant secretaries have initially issued draft permits as well as
compliance orders and penalty assessments. If the applicant, respondent, or a
member of the public objected, the case was generally referred to an adjudicatory
hearing with the secretary making the final decision when any party to the
hearing objected to the proposed order or decision of the hearing officer.'o
Act 739 alters this process by making the decision of the administrative law
judge (the new name for the hearing officer) the final administrative decision
162. La. R.S. 49:994(D), 998 (Supp. 1997). See supra notes 72-85 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 82 and accompanying text (raising issue of whether requirements of La. K.S.
30:2050.14 regarding qualifications of hearing officers in environmental cases was implicitly repealed
by 1995 La. Acts No. 739).
164. La. R.S. 30:2011(AX) (1989).
165. 452 So. 2d 1152 (La. 1984).
166. La. Const. art. IX, § 1. The constitutional provision provides:
The natural resources of the state, including air and water, and the healthful, scenic,
historic, and esthetic quality of the environment shall be protected, conserved, and
replenished insofar as possible and consistent with the health, safety, and welfare of the
people. The legislature shall enact laws to implement this policy.
167. La. R.S. 30:2014(A) (1989).
168. La. R.S. 30:2013 (1989).
169. The administrative enforcement chapter that the legislature added to the Environmental




with no opportunity of appeal to, or review by, the secretary.'70 As a practical
matter, the new provisions will completely eliminate the secretary from the
decision making process unless the department alters its procedures to involve
the secretary before the adjudicatory hearing is held.'
The secretary may try to retain final authority over some decisions on the
basis of the exception applicable when compliance with the new adjudication
procedures conflict with a federal mandate. 72 The Department of Environmen-
tal Quality administers federal programs relating to air pollution, water pollution,
and hazardous wastes.'" To retain that authority, the state must comply with
the requirements of federal law,' 74 including the submission of any changes in
the state program to the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for
approval. 7' At a minimum, EPA might insist that the state submit the new
procedures for approval before they apply to federal programs. Moreover, if
EPA finds that transferring final administrative authority to an administrative law
judge would violate the requirements of the relevant federal statute, the federal-
mandate exemption of Act 739 might apply permanently.
Almost as lamentable is the uncertainty created by the new statutory
provisions. First, as explained above," 6 the new chapter on environmental
procedures contains several significant provisions that may or may not be held
to be inconsistent with the new provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act.
More importantly, the new provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act fail
to define the powers of the administrative law judges with precision.
An administrative decision on a permit or an enforcement action has three
components: a determination of the facts on which the decision is based, a
construction of the applicable law, and the exercise of discretion to decide which
one of the legally permissible decisions is appropriate. Ordinarily, courts are
very deferential to an agency's factual determination, reversing the agency only
when the agency's decision is "[m]anifestly erroneous in view of the reliable,
probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record.1'"17 On questions of
law, the authority of the courts is much broader; they are the ultimate experts in
legal interpretation, even though-when the statutory language is unclear-they
may defer to an agency's reasonable interpretation of a statute.7 8 Finally, the
170. La. P.S. 49:992(B)(2) (Supp. 1997).
171. SeeLa. R.S. 30:2050.25(B)(Supp. 1997) (allowingthe secretary to actpersonally with respect
to any matter that the administrative enforcement chapter authorizes an assistant secretary to act).
172. La. R.S. 49:992(D)(2) (Supp. 1997). See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
173. See 33 U.S.C. § 402(b) (1994) (Clean Water Act), 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b) (1994) (Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act); 42 U.S.C. § 7410(aX2), (k)(3) (1994) (Clean Air Act).
174. 33 U.S.C. § 402(c)(2) (1994) (Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 6926(c) (1994) (Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act); 42 U.S.C. § 7410(aX2)(A) (1994) (Clean Air Act).
175. This requirement is explicit in the Clean Air Act. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(aX2)(H) (1994).
176. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
177. La. R.S. 49:964(GX6) (1987).
178. See, e.g., In re Recovery 1, Inc., 635 So. 2d 690, 696 (La. App. Ist Cir.), writ denied, 639
So. 2d 1169 (La. 1994). At the federal level, the Supreme Court's application of this principle in
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authority of the courts to overturn an agency's choice from legally permissible
alternatives is very limited. A court can reverse the agency's decision only if it
is "arbitrary or capricious or characterized by an abuse of discretion or clearly
unwarranted exercise of discretion."''
The new statute making the decision of the administrative law judge final
makes no attempt to define what deference, if any, the administrative judge must
give to the decision of the agency. The sensible result is to give the administra-
tive law judge broad power to find facts but to require deference on questions
of statutory interpretation and agency discretion.
On the factual question, the administrative law judge should make a de novo
decision. Louisiana requires an agency to produce legally admissible evidence
to support its administrative decision.Is' The adjudication provides the
applicant or respondent an opportunity to force the agency to satisfy that
requirement as well as to cross-examine agency witnesses and to introduce
evidence to contradict the agency's position."' Giving deference to a factual
decision made before the hearing would make the adjudication an empty
formality.
The decision of the agency with respect to legal issues should not bind the
administrative law judge, but he or she should give the agency at least as much
deference as a court would give. The agency, not the administrative law judge,
is responsible for administering the statute, and the agency also has the expertise
to determine what approaches are likely to be effective in solving the problems
the legislature has directed the agency to address, Of course, an agency might
make a decision that is unreasonable or conflicts with the clear language of the
statute. Allowing an administrative law judge to reject the agency's legal
position in such cases causes little difficulty so long as the agency can obtain
judicial review of the administrative decision.
The real battleground is likely to concern the matter of discretionary choices
that the agency is authorized to make. If the agency's decision is legally
permissible under the facts established in the adjudicatory hearing, the courts
Chevron, USA v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984).
has sparked much commentary. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Administrative
Precedent, 101 Yale L.J. 969 (1992); Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron
Doctrine, 72 Wash. U. L.Q. 351 (1994); Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron
Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 Duke L.J. 984; Kenneth W. Staff
et al., Judicial Review of Administrative Action in a Conservative Era, 39 Admin. L. Rev. 353
(1987); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration after Chevron, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 2071 (1990).
179. La. R.S. 49:964(G)(5) (1987). See, e.g., In re Supplemental Fuels, Inc., 656 So. 2d 29, 39
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1995); In re Recovery 1, Inc., 635 So. 2d 690, 699-700 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ
denied, 639 So. 2d 1169 (La. 1994).
180. Although hearsay evidence is admissible in administrative hearings, La. R.S. 49:956(1987),
the agency cannot rely on evidence that would be inadmissible in judicial proceedings as the "sole"
basis for its decision. See. e.g., Bourque v. Louisiana State Racing Comm'n, 611 So. 2d 742 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1992); Lee v. Brown, 148 So. 2d 321 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
181. La. R.S. 49:955(C) (1987).
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should require the administrative law judge to accept the agency's resolution of
the matter. To grant the administrative law judge authority to reverse the
discretionary choice of the agency would be to construe a procedural amendment
as effecting a massive shift in the substantive authority of state agencies. In the
specific case of the Department of Environmental Quality, it would also be
inconsistent with the legislative directives' that the secretary is primarily
responsible for fulfilling the state's constitutional duty to protect the environ-
ment. ' 3
D. Permits
Because the legislature rejected the law institute's proposal establishing
uniform procedures for all permits issued by the Department of Environmental
Quality, the department is likely to continue processing permits as it has done in
the past. The statutory requirements are minimal, and the rules establishing each
permit program set forth the various requirements.
The changes regarding adjudications and judicial review may have a significant
practical impact on the processing of environmental permits. Nothing in the
Environmental Quality Act grants an applicant the right to an adjudicatory hearing,
but the judicial review section does authorize the applicant to petition for a de novo
hearing in the Nineteenth Judicial District Court if a request for an adjudicatory
hearing is denied.'" In the past, that possibility virtually guaranteed that the
secretary would grant the request for an adjudicatory hearing. Now, however, the
secretary loses final decision-making authority following an adjudication,'" and
the case will be reviewed in the district court regardless of whether the secretary
grants the request for a hearing."' In light of these changes, the secretary may
find the prospect of a petition for de novo review in the district court less daunting.
E. Enforcement
The new Environmental Quality Act chapter. on administrative enforce-
ment'87 contains some positive aspects. First, it establishes a uniform procedure
for administrative responses to violations of the various substantive laws that
constitute the Environmental Quality Act.'" Second, it clarifies and expands the
rights of the respondent to challenge the agency's determinations about whether a
violation occurred and, if so, what administrative sanction is appropriate."'
182. La. R.S. 30:201 1(AXI). 2014(A) (1989). See supra notes 164-167 and accompanying text.
183. La. Const. art. IX, § 1. See supra notes 1, 166 and accompanying text.
184. La. R.S. 30:2024(C) (Supp. 1997).
185. La. R.S. 49:992(BX2) (Supp. 1997). See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
186. La. R.S. 30:2050.21(A) (Supp. 1997). See supra notes 129-136 and accompanying text.
187. La. R.S. 30:2050.1-.29 (Supp. 1997). See supra notes 89-120 and accompanying text
188. La. R.S. 30:2050.2°.5, .16-.17, .19 (Supp. 1997).
189. La. R.S. 30:2050.1(C), .3(B), .4(A), (C), .9 (Supp. 1997).
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Third, it provides the public with greater information regarding environmental
enforcement actions"90 and includes statutory authority allowing affected
members of the public to participate in administrative enforcement actions.",
Other aspects of the new enforcement chapter are less likely to have significant
practical impact. The new statutory provision regarding settlements and compro-
mises"92 expands the secretary's power to act without seeking the concurrence of
the Attorney General, but actual cases of conflict between the two agencies have
been rare. Similarly, the department is unlikely to make extensive use of the
informal procedures that the secretary can establish by rule." 3 The department
may only use the new procedures if the respondent consents. If the respondent is
agreeable, the secretary will probably find it easier to settle or to compromise the
action without using formal or informal procedures."4
Unfortunately, the changes introduced by Act 739 frustrate many of the
positive aspects of the new chapter on administrative enforcement of the Environ-
mental Quality Act. Most importantly, it undermines the secretary's enforcement
authority by making the administrative law judge responsible for making the final
administrative decision.'" In addition, it effectively eliminates the secretary
from the administrative process that the statute prescribes. The new chapter on
administrative enforcement provides for imposition of an initial sanction by an
assistant secretary with an appeal to the secretary following the adjudicatory
hearing; 4 however, Act 739 eliminates the appeal to the secretary. To retain any
role in the process, the secretary will have to make use of the reserved authority to
exercise any power that the Environmental Quality Act grants to an assistant
secretary'" and issue the sanction before the adjudication occurs. Finally, the
amendments to the Act create uncertainty about the exact scope of the administra-
tive law judge's authority to reserve a decision of the department as well as the
continued viability of a number ofthe provisions of the Environmental Quality Act
relating to adjudications and hearing officers."'
F. Declaratory Rulings
The impact of the new provision on declaratory rulings'" remains unclear.
The Administrative Procedure Act has long authorized the issuance of similar
190. La. R.S. 30:2050.1(B) (Supp. 1997).
191. La. R.S. 30:2050.7(B), (D), .12(A) (Supp. 1997).
192. La. R.S. 30:2050.7 (Supp. 1997).
193. La. R.S. 30:2050.6 (Supp. 1997).
194. In re BASF Corp., Chem. Div., 538 So. 2d 635, 642 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1988), writ granted
on other grounds, 539 So. 2d 624, writ denied. 541 So. 2d 900 (1989), held that the secretary may
hold informal meetings with a respondent to negotiate a settlement or compromise.
195. La. R.S. 49:992(BX2) (Supp. 1997). See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
196. La. R.S. 30:2050.16, .17 (Supp. 1997).
197. La. R.S. 30:2050.25(B) (Supp. 1997).
198. See supra notes 75-85 and accompanying text.
199. La. ILS. 30:2050.10 (Supp. 1997). See supra notes 121-128 and accompanying text.
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"declaratory orders," but neither the secretary nor any other agency has made
extensive use of that authority. The new addition to the Environmental Quality Act
attempts to force the secretary to use it by two means. It creates a judicially
enforceable duty to issue rules governing declaratory rulings,20' and it allows
anyone who petitions for a declaratory ruling to file an action for a declaratory
judgment if the secretary declines to issue a declaratory ruling in any particular
case.
2
Fortunately, the secretary retains control over the declaratory ruling process.
The statute does not require the secretary to hold an adjudicatory hearing on a
petition for a declaratory ruling. Thus, the secretary does not have to cede authority
to make the final administrative decision to an administrative law judge.
The great danger of the new procedure is its potential to dilute the secretary's
control over the department's regulatory agenda. If the courts construe the
authority of a rejected petitioner to "proceed" to seek a declaratory judgmentz"
to create an entitlement to a judicial decision on any regulatory dispute, the
regulated community (or any other group that can satisfy the "aggrieved person"
standard)' will have the power to decide what matters deserve the attention of
the regulators. Such a holding would force the department to make a Hobson's
choice: either use the limited agency resources to focus administratively on the
problems that outsiders regard as most important, or lose the presumption of
administrative regularity (and possibly consume greater agency resources) in
defending a judicial action for a declaratory judgment. In an era of reduced
funding, the impact of that loss of control over the regulatory agenda could greatly
diminish the department's ability to address the problems that it regards as most
pressing.
The courts can minimize the potential adverse impact of the new provision by
applying traditional doctrines of administrative law. The new chapter on
environmental enforcement merely authorizes the filing of a declaratory judgment
action. It does not purport to change substantive doctrines (for example, ripeness)
that limit the availability of declaratory relief under both the Administrative
Procedure Act and the Code of Civil Procedure. °"
200. La. l.S. 49:962 (1987). The section appears to impose a mandatory duty to issue rules that
establish a system for issuing declaratory orders and for promptly disposing of petitions. It does not,
however, appear to require that a declaratory order must be issued with regard to any particular
matter. Most agencies (including the Department of Environmental Quality) have not complied with
the statutory duty to issue the necessary procedural rules for issuing declaratory orders.
201. La. R.S. 30:2050.10(A). .29(A) (Supp. 1997).
202. La. R.S. 30:2050.10(C) (Supp. 1997).
203. Id.
204. La. R.S. 30:2050.21(A) (Supp. 1997).
205. Louisiana courts, like their federal counterparts, have long held that "declaratory relief is
available only to decide justiciable controversies, and that such enactments do not empower the courts
to render advisory opinions on abstract questions of law." Abbot v. Parker, 259 La. 279, 249 So.
2d 908, 918 (Tate, J.), appeal dismissed, Branton v. Parker, 404 U.S. 931, 92 S. Ct. 281 (1971)




The new judicial review provisions have generated considerable political
controversy. After an initial loss in the legislature,2' opponents of the new
provision obtained a judicial declaration that the statute transferring jurisdiction
from the First Circuit Court of Appeal to the Nineteenth Judicial District Court was
unconstitutional.' Almost immediately, supporters of the change obtained new
legislation, and the first circuit held that the new law was constitutional.2"e
of New Orleans, 246 La. 417, 165 So. 2d 9 (1969); and Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 81 S. CL 1752
(1961). See also La. Code Civ. P. art. 1876 ("The court may refuse to render a declaratory judgment
or decree where such judgment or decree, if rendered, would not terminate the uncertainty or
controversy giving rise to the proceeding.").
The overriding requirement of a "justiciable controversy" can be analyzed in terms of several
criteria, including the requirements: that the controversy be "actual" rather than hypothetical; that
the plaintiff have "standing" (which includes, among other things, that the plaintiff show an injury
in fact, directly traceable to some act or decision by the agency); and that the dispute be "ripe." As
the Abbott court put it:
[A] "justiciable controversy" connotes, in the present sense, an existing actual and
substantial dispute, as distinguished from one that is merely hypothetical or abstract, and
a dispute which involves the legal relations of parties who have real adverse interests, and
upon which the judgment of the court may effectively operate through a decree of
conclusive character. Further, the plaintiff should have a legally protecthble and tangible
interest at stake, and the dispute should be of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant
the issuance of a declaratory judgment.
Abbott, 249 So. 2d at 918. For further discussion of various particular elements that determine
whether a declaratory action presents a "justiciable controversy," see, e.g., Louisiana Assoc. Gen.
Contractors, Inc. v. State, 669 So. 2d 1185, 1190-95 (La. 1996) (discussing requirements of
organizational standing and non-mootness in the context of declaratory action); American Waste &
Pollution Control Co. v. St. Martin Parish Police Jury, 627 So. 2d 138, 161-62 (La. 1993) (rejecting
declaratory action as unripe because it was "based on a contingency which may not arise"); Ricard
v. State, 544 So. 2d 1310, 1312 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989) (lack of standing); Atchafalaya Basin Levee
District v. Pecquet, 364 So. 2d 610 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978) (lack of real adversity of interests);
Upper Audubon Ass'n v. Audubon Park Comm'n, 329 So. 2d 209 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976)
(dismissing declaratory action as moot); Rambin v. Caddo Parish Police Jury, 316 So. 2d 499 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1975) (lack of adversity); 2 Steven Plotkin, Louisiana Civil Procedure 249-50 (1996);
Wilson R. Ramshur, Comment, Declaratory Judgments in Louisiana, 33 La. L. Rev. 127, 130-34
(1972) (discussing issue generally, but focusing on requirement that the action be brought by a party
with a real interest in the outcome, against a truly adverse opponent).
These requirements apply with full force to challenges to administrative acts or failures to act. See,
e.g., Peterson v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 671 So. 2d 460 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1995) (holding that
declaratory action intended to establish whether the PSC had jurisdiction over nonprofit rural water
system failed to present justiciable controversy); Sholar v. East Baton Rouge Parish Council, 393 So.
2d 290 (La. App. ist Cir. 1981) (declaratory challenge to grant of zoning variances dismissed as
moot).
The author expresses appreciation to Professor John Devlin of the Paul M. Hebert Law Center for
his assistance in preparing this footnote.
206. 1995 La. Acts Nos. 947, § 8; 1208, § 1. See supra notes 129-133 and accompanying text.
207. In re Rubicon, Inc., 670 So. 2d 475 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1996).
208. 1996 La. Acts No. 41, § 1.
209. In re Angus Chem. Co., 679 So. 2d 454 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1996).
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From a practical standpoint, the only certain impact of the new statute will
be to delay the resolution of judicial challenges to decisions of the secretary. As
with judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act, '20 the new
provision for judicial review under the Environmental Quality Act confines
review to the administrative record, 2 and either party can appeal an adverse
decision to the district court. In effect, the system now provides for three
(district court, court of appeal, supreme court) rather than two (court of appeal,
supreme court) levels of judicial review. That result is somewhat surprising in
view of the contemporaneous provisions providing for a preliminary administra-
tive review by granting responsibility for the final administrative decision to an
administrative law judge rather than to the secretary.212
Some observers have suggested that district court scrutiny may be stricter
in practice even though the legal standard is the same. They have identified
three characteristics of district courts that may encourage closer scrutiny than is
normally provided in the court of appeal: A district court routinely makes de
novo decisions rather than merely affirming or reversing the decisions of lower
courts; a district court will probably grant opponents of the administrative action
more time for oral argument than is typically granted by an appellate court; and
a district court can receive additional evidence if the administrative record is
inadequate. Only experience with future litigation will confirm if these
institutional differences will produce different results in actual cases.
III. THE DESIRABILITY OF THE CHANGES
No assessment of the overall impact of the recent changes affecting
environmental procedures is value-neutral. Any evaluation of the desirability of
the new statutory provisions depends on the perspective of the observer.
Environmental regulations are always costly, especially when they are
vigorously enforced. Thus, the regulated community normally wants to avoid
both regulations and enforcement whenever possible. Regulated entities also
prefer to reduce public input and to delay regulation and enforcement when
permanent avoidance is impossible. Finally, those subject to environmental
regulations tend to favor reduced administrative discretion over the content and
priorities of the regulatory agenda as well as increased grounds and venues for
challenging regulations and defending enforcement actions.
Judged from the perspective of the regulated community, the new procedures
described in this article are highly desirable. By limiting the funding available
to the Department of Environmental Quality and enacting substantial new hurdles
to the issuance of rules and administrative sanctions, fewer regulatory initiatives
and less administrative enforcement are likely to occur in the coming years.
210. See La. R.S. 49:964(0) (1987).
21 i. La. R.S. 30:2050.21(C) (Supp. 1997).
212. La. ILS. 49:992(BX2) (Supp. 1997).
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Although the Environmental Quality Act grants the public substantial opportuni-
ties to participate in rulemaking procedures and the chapter on administrative
enforcement expands the rights of members of the public to participate in formal
enforcement proceedings, the obstacles to new rules and the secretary's
diminished powers of enforcement are likely to encourage a cooperative
regulatory atmosphere that will substantially reduce public scrutiny of the
regulatory process. Moreover, the new requirements for issuing rules, the
expanded protections for respondents in administrative enforcement proceedings,
and the additional layer of judicial review will at least delay rules and sanctions
in cases where the department ultimately achieves its objectives. Likewise, the
transfer of the final administrative decision in cases of adjudications from the
secretary to the administrative law judge and the right of an applicant to file an
action for declaratory judgment when the secretary declines to issue a declaratory
ruling have the potential to restrict substantially the secretary's control of the
regulatory and enforcement agenda. Finally, the ambiguity regarding the new
risk-assessment requirement, the precise scope of the authority of the administra-
tive law judge, the continuing validity of the adjudicatory hearing provisions of
the new chapter of the Environmental Quality Act on administrative enforcement,
and the new declaratory ruling section give lawyers who represent the regulatory
community a plethora of new legal issues that the courts will not definitively
resolve for years to come.
Of course, a perspective biased toward effective protection of the environ-
ment would produce a somewhat different appraisal of the new procedures. The
vision of an observer with that perspective would be to create an environmental
agency that was firm, but fair, in regulating those who pollute the environment
and in enforcing the regulations against violators. The essential condition for
establishing such an agency would be adequate funding, but one could also
identify other criteria for evaluation.
An agency committed to firm, but fair protection of the environment should
maximize the use of legislative rules to establish its policies. Using rules both
insures wide applicability of the policies and provides notice of what is expected
to those affected by them.
The agency should also approach environmental problems aggressively and
evenhandedly. It should address environmental concerns promptly and should
remain responsible and accountable for its decisions. Of course, the agency
should base its decisions (especially on permit applications and in enforcement
actions) on nonpartisan considerations.
Strict, consistent, and uniform enforcement is yet another element of
effective environmental protection. To avoid granting a perverse incentive to
polluters, the agency should have broad administrative authority to mandate the
elimination of violations and to impose substantial monetary penalties against
violators. For more serious actions, the agency should have a judicial venue for
imposing sanctions. Finally, the agency should have expedited procedures for
responding to minor violations.
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Judicial review is also an essential component of any fair system of
environmental regulation. Individuals affected by environmental regulatory
decisions should have the opportunity to obtain an independent review of the
administrative decision. The system should, however, provide for prompt
resolution of judicial disputes. Moreover, to preserve agency accountability,
courts should limit their review of agency decisions to the administrative record.
One who views Louisiana's recent reforms by the standards of the preceding
paragraphs can find far less to praise in them than apologists for the regulated
community. The new procedures are likely to discourage rules and enforcement
actions and to delay both when the department does act. In addition, the
amended procedural requirements lengthen the process ofjudicial review beyond
what is needed to protect the legitimate interests of the regulated community and
the public.
The recent restrictions on the imposition of new and increased fees constitute
a major setback for regulatory efforts to protect the environment. Effective
regulation and enforcement cost money, and the new limits make it unlikely that
new funds for environmental protection will be forthcoming for the foreseeable
future. Moreover, a very practical reason exists for preferring fees to taxes for
funding environmental regulatory activities. Fees imposed on those that pollute
the environment force those activities to internalize some of the environmental
costs they impose on the community as a whole. Where alternatives to pollution
exist, a fee system encourages polluters to eliminate pollution when elimination
is efficient.
The new rulemaking procedures are also likely to make new regulatory
initiatives difficult, if not impossible; when policy changes do occur, they are
likely to proceed by informal agreements" between the regulators and polluters
rather than by a public decision-making process. Particularly objectionable is
the requirement for a formal risk-assessment analysis for new rules.2"3 Its
practical impact will be to deter new rules until after harm has been documented
because it has already occurred. Also lamentable is the discriminatory nature of
some of the new procedures. Even though they amend the Administrative
Procedure Act rather than the Environmental Quality Act, some of the most
onerous of the new requirements apply only to rules issued by the Department
of Environmental Quality.214
The statute creating an administrative division in the Department of State
Civil Service is likely to have an adverse impact on the permitting and
enforcement functions of the Department of Environmental Quality. The creation
of an independent division with supervisory authority over all administrative law
judges is theoretically desirable, ' but its practical impact will be slight.
However, the adverse impact of allowing the administrative law judge to make
213. La. L.S. 49:953(0) (Supp. 1997). See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
214. See La. R.S. 49:953(F)(3), (0) (Supp. 1997).
215. La. R.S. 49:994, 996-97 (Supp. 1997). See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
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the final administrative decision is likely to be considerable.2"6 It will reduce
the department's accountability for the consequences of its decisions. For
permitting decisions, it will strengthen the applicant's hand in negotiating permit
conditions and will discourage public input. When violations occur, the transfer
of final administrative authority will discourage the agency from using formal
means of administrative enforcement. Here also, public participation is likely to
be diminished, and the negotiating position of the polluter is likely to be
strengthened.
The changes relating to administrative enforcement present more of a mixed
bag. In some respects, the provisions of the new Environmental Quality Act
chapter are consistent with firm, but fair enforcement of the Act against violators.
The chapter mandates use of rules to establish departmental policies.2 '" It also
establishes a uniform process that weighs the interests of the respondent, the
public, and the department. On the other hand, the secretary's authority to
compromise compliance orders was needlessly expanded."' 8 Further, the
provision for informal proceedings was rendered impotent by requiring the
consent of the respondent to use them.2t 9
Unfortunately, granting the administrative law judge the authority to make
the final administrative decision in adjudications20 subverts much of the
desirable reform of the new enforcement chapter of the Environmental Quality
Act. Most importantly, it diminishes the secretary's responsibility for effective
enforcement of the environmental statutes and rules. In addition, it renders
unworkable the new statutory process for handling administrative enforcement
actions.
Although the judicial review provisions have generated considerable public
controversy, the impact of the 1995 and 1996 statutes22' relating to judicial
review is likely to be modest. Adding a new layer of judicial review in the
district court seems wasteful, but the substantive basis for review remains the
administrative record.' Moreover, with fewer rules and enforcement actions,
the number of judicial appeals will also probably fall.
The uncoordinated nature of the recent changes adds a number of technical
concerns regarding the new statutes. The Environmental Quality Act chapter on
administrative enforcement is the remnant of a law institute process that involved
representatives of the secretary, the regulated community, and environmental
groups. However, the legislature enacted the other statutes without significant
public debate. One consequence is significant ambiguity regarding the new
216. La. K.S. 49:992(BX2) (Supp. 1997). See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
217. La. R.S. 30:2050.1(A), .3(A) (Supp. 1997). See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
218. La. IKS. 30:2050.7(A) (Supp. 1997). See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
219. La. R.S. 30:2050.6(A) (Supp. 1997). See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
220. La.S. 49:992(BX2) (Supp. 1997).
221. 1996 La. Acts No. 41, § I (Extraordinary Session); 1995 La. Acts No. 1208, § 1. See
supra notes 129-133 and accompanying text.
222. La. KS. 30:2050.21(C) (Supp. 1997). See supra notes 134-138 and accompanying text.
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provisions. The doubtful issues include the scope of the constitutional limitation
on fees,' the individual responsible for the final administrative decision for
federal programs administered by the Department of Environmental Quality, 27
the potential inconsistencies between the amendments regarding adjudicatory
hearings,' the availability of declaratory relief following an administrative
refusal to grant a declaratory ruling,z' and the possibility that the district court
may apply a stricter scrutiny than the court of appeals in reviewing administra-
tive decisions.' Representatives of the regulated community can rejoice in
the new issues that have been handed to them. Environmentalists can only
lament the new uncertainty that has been introduced into the state's fulfillment
of its constitutional duty to protect the environment.
From the perspective of one who hopes to protect the environment, the
losses of the new statutes far outweigh the small improvement in enforcement
procedures. Indeed, the recent Louisiana reforms seem to provide an example
on the state level of a recent phenomenon that has recently been documented on
the federal level: using the mantle of administrative reform to disguise a
substantive goal of reduced protection for the environment.2"'
223. La. Const. art. Vfl, § 2.1.
224. See supra notes 173-175 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 75-85 and accompanying text.
226. La. R.S. 30:2050.10(C) (Supp. 1997). See supra notes 203.205 and accompanying text.
227. See supra text following note 212.
228. See Robert L. Glicksman and Stephen B. Chapman, Regulatory Reform and (Breach o]) The
Contract With America, 5 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 9 (1996).
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